\section{Analytic Dissection Test}

The Ninth Circuit has adopted the analytic dissection test to determine

whether one program is a derivative work of another. Apple Computer,

Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994). The analytic

dissection test first considers whether there are substantial similarities

in both the ideas and expressions of the two works at issue. Once the

similar features are identified, analytic dissection is used to determine

whether any of those similar features are protected by copyright. This

step is the same as the filtration step in the AFC test. After identifying

the copyrightable similar features of the works, the court then decides

whether those features are entitled to ``broad'' or ``thin''

protection. ``Thin'' protection is given to non-copyrightable facts or

ideas that are combined in a way that affords copyright protection only

from their alignment and presentation, while ``broad'' protection is given

to copyrightable expression itself. Depending on the degree of protection

afforded, the court then sets the appropriate standard for a subjective

comparison of the works to determine whether, as a whole, they are

sufficiently similar to support a finding that one is a derivative work of

the other. ``Thin'' protection requires the second work be virtually

identical in order to be held a derivative work of an original, while

``broad'' protection requires only a ``substantial similarity.''

\section{No Protection for ``Methods of Operation''}

The First Circuit has taken the position that the AFC test is inapplicable 

when the works in question relate to unprotectable elements set forth in 

\S~102(b).  Their approach results in a much narrower definition

of derivative work for software in comparison to other circuits. Specifically, 

the

First Circuit holds that ``method of operation,'' as used in \S~102(b) of

the Copyright Act, refers to the means by which users operate

(1st Cir. 1995).  In Lotus, the court held that a menu command

hierarchy for a computer program was uncopyrightable because it did not

user, but also served as a method by which the program was operated and

of a menu command hierarchy, or any other ``method of operation,'' cannot

form the basis for a determination that one work is a derivative of

another.  As a result, courts in the First Circuit that apply the AFC test

do so only after applying a broad interpretation of \S~102(b) to filter out

unprotected elements. E.g., Real View, LLC v. 20-20 Technologies, Inc., 

683 F. Supp.2d 147, 154 (D. Mass. 2010).

\section{No Test Yet Adopted}

Several circuits, most notably the Fourth and Seventh, have yet to

declare their definition of derivative work and whether or not the

AFC, Analytic Dissection, or some other test best fits their

interpretation of copyright law. Therefore, uncertainty exists with

respect to determining the extent to which a software program is a

derivative work of another in those circuits. However, one may presume

that they would give deference to the AFC test since it is by far the

majority rule amongst those circuits that have a standard for defining

a software derivative work.

\section{Cases Applying Software Derivative Work Analysis}

In the preeminent case regarding the definition of a derivative work for

software, Computer Associates v. Altai, the plaintiff alleged that its

program, Adapter, which was used to handle the differences in operating

system calls and services, was infringed by the defendant's competitive

program, Oscar. About 30\% of Oscar was literally the same code as

that in Adapter. After the suit began, the defendant rewrote those

portions of Oscar that contained Adapter code in order to produce a new

version of Oscar that was functionally competitive with Adapter, without

have any literal copies of its code. Feeling slighted still, the

plaintiff alleged that even the second version of Oscar, despite having no