@@ -3705,13 +3705,19 @@ classes of patent commitments.
Specifically, the ideal might have been for GPLv3 to feature a patent license
grant triggered by all acts of distribution of GPLv3-covered works. The FSF
considered it during the GPLv3 drafting process, but many patent-holding
companies objected to this policy. They have made two objections: (1) the
companies objected to this policy. They have made two objections:
\begin{enumerate}
\item the
far-reaching impact of the patent license grant on the patent holder is
disproportionate to the act of merely distributing code without modification
or transformation, and (2) it is unreasonable to expect an owner of vast
or transformation, and
\item it is unreasonable to expect an owner of vast
patent assets to exercise requisite diligence in reviewing all the
GPL-covered software that it provides to others. Some expressed particular
concern about the consequences of ``inadvertent'' distribution.
\end{enumerate}
The argument that the impact of the patent license grant would be
``disproportionate'', that is to say unfair, is not valid. Since